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Federal Judges: The Appointing Process*
The author examines the various factors which interact
in the process of appointing federal judges. After ex-
ploring the background of law and custom underlying
the process, he presents examples of the various pres-
sures at work and examines the interplay of forces. He
notes the varying effects and shifting balance of power
depending upon the court to which appointment is being
made.
Harold W. Chaset
INTRODUCTION
Baseball games are played under a well-defined set of rules
and customs by players manning prescribed positions, yet it is
probable that no two games have been identical. These gen-
eralizations about the national pastime provide a good analogy
for the process of appointing federal judges. These appointments
are made pursuant to law and custom largely by a line-up of
individuals occupying prescribed positions. While there are es-
tablished patterns, the participants interact differently in each
appointment within the framework of law and custom.
In one respect, the analogy breaks down. A baseball team
fields nine men and has a roster of eligible players limited by
statutory baseball law. In the appointing process, there are
certain players who must participate in the game: the Presi-
dent; United States Senators; the Department of Justice; the
candidates for the judgeship; the Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary of the American Bar Association; and political party
leaders. But there is no statutory prescription limiting the
game to only these participants. Frequently, others may vol-
untarily or involuntarily be drawn into the process.
As in baseball, how well the game is played, or how good
the appointments are, is determined in large part by the ability,
* The following is an interim report on an extensive study of the
appointment of federal judges being done under the auspices of The
Brookings Institution. In the interest of brevity, some of the supporting
data for statements made have not been included here but will, of course,
be included in the final work. Many of the insights into the appointive
process have been derived from personal interviews with officials who
preferred not to be quoted. Their confidence is respected, and their as-
sistance is greatly appreciated.
t Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota.
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drive and ingenuity of the players. Hopefully the appointing
team can outperform the greatest of the New York Yankee
teams. As a former Department of Justice official observed
about the baseball analogy, "[A] baseball team can usually win a
pennant by winning 70 per cent of its games; we like to do
better than that."
A. LAW Am CUSTOM
Surprisingly, in view of the substantial opinion to the con-
trary, the Constitution is ambiguous as to how federal judges,
save Supreme Court justices, must be appointed. Article II, sec-
tion 2, provides that the President:
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by law ....
The provision continues, "but the Congress may by Law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in
the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." Thus the question is whether federal judges are
"other officers" or "inferior officers." If the answer is inferior,
then Congress has the power to alter the mode of appointment
within the prescribed limits without a constitutional amendment.
Congress could, for example, grant the Supreme Court power to
appoint judges to lower federal courts.
For much of our history, it was assumed that federal judges
were other officers.1 Early statutes dealing with federal judges
stated only that they be appointed without specifying the ap-
propriate procedure. 2 The practice historically has been for
the President to appoint with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Congress in 1891 provided specifically that "there shall be
appointed by the President of the United States, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, in each circuit an additional
1. See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNiTED
STATES § 1593 n.2 (1833).
2. Whether the Judges of the inferior courts of the United
States are such inferior officers, as the constitution contem-
plates to be within the power of congress, to prescribe the mode
of appointment of, so as to vest it in the president alone, or in
the courts of law, or in the heads of departments, is a point,
upon which no solemn judgment has ever been had. The prac-
tical construction has uniformly been, that they are not such
inferior officers. And no act of congress prescribes the mode
of their appointment.
Id. at § 1593 n.1.
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circuit judge .... ,,3 The recodification of the law in 1948 pro-
vided explicitly for the first time that all federal judges be ap-
pointed with the advice and consent of the Senate. 4 Congress
has not chosen to deviate from this position.5 Unfortunately, the
legislative history of these provisions provides no clue as to why
Congress adopted them. It seems a fair conclusion, however,
that Congress simply considered these provisions to be consistent
with the constitutional mandate.
In 1930, Professor Burke Shartel argued persuasively that
federal judges below the Supreme Court level were inferior
officers in the constitutional sense.6 He suggested that although
inferior is usually defined as petty or unimportant, it can also be
understood in a relational sense, that is, inferior to others.7 At
least one federal court has reached the same conclusion.8 Thus,
in this sense, even very important officers could be inferior.
As Shartel also pointed out, the words of the Constitution sup-
port the relational connotation of inferior, particularly with re-
spect to federal judges, for the courts upon which they sit are
styled in the Constitution as inferior courts.9
In practice, the Senate is deeply involved in the appoint-
ment of federal judges, whatever the Framers intended. We can
only speculate on the courts' reaction if Congress were to at-
tempt to exclude the Senate by lodging the appointing power in
the President alone, the courts, or the Attorney General (as
head of a department), and the legislation were challenged. 10
3. 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
4. 28 U.S.C. 8 133 (1964).
5. 28 U.S.C. §8 44, 133 (1964).
6. Shartel, Federal Judges - Appointment, Supervision, and Re-
moval - Some Possibilities Under the Constitution (pts. 1-3), 28 MIcH.
L. REV. 485. 723, 870 (1930).
7. Id. at 500-01. Shartel found support for his position in United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1878). For a pithy comment suggesting
the difficulty of relying on that decision for this purpose see CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1948 365-66 (4th ed. 1957).
8. See Collins v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 568, 574 (1878) (case did
not involve judges).
9. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. HI, § 1; Shartel, supra note
6, at 501.
10. For one such speculation see HARRIS, THE ADvicE AND CONSENT
OF THE SENATE 15 (1953). The author suggests that: "The decision con-
cerning which officers should be appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the Senate is essentially political in character and has ap-
propriately been left to legislative rather than judicial determination."
But the fact remains that the courts have never dealt squarely with the
issue and, consequently, have never clearly indicated that they would
leave it to Congress to decide whether federal judges were "inferior" or
"other" officers.
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1. Senatorial Courtesy
It is unclear why the Founding Fathers granted the Senate
the power to advise and consent to appointments and how they
expected the Senate to perform these functions. Recall that for-
midable protagonists for two conflicting proposals battled to pre-
vail at the Convention. There were those, including Hamilton
and Madison, who wanted the President alone to have the power
to appoint. Others, including Sherman and Franklin, wanted
the Senate alone to have the power." According to Hamilton,
the resulting compromise was that the Senate would merely
pass on presidential nominations as a body.12 In practice, how-
ever, Senators have been unwilling to accept such a limited role.
Senators, whether chosen by state legislatures or by the vot-
ers of the state, must continuously nurture their political sup-
port back home if they desire re-election. Senators, since the
first Congress, have recognized that Senators from the state
where the appointment is to be made have a much greater stake
in a particular appointment than the other Senators. It is, of
course, exceedingly useful to a Senator to be able to reward
supporters with good posts in the federal government. Converse-
ly, it is enormously damaging to a Senator's prestige if a Presi-
dent of the same party ignores him when making an appoint-
ment involving the Senator's home state. It is even more dam-
aging to a Senator's prestige and political power for the Presi-
dent to appoint to high federal office someone who is known
as a political opponent of the Senator. Senators soon realized
that if they united to protect their individual interests in ap-
pointments, they could assure that the President could make
only such appointments as would be palatable to them as in-
dividuals. Out of such considerations grew the custom of sena-
torial courtesy.
For much of our history, senatorial courtesy could be de-
fined accurately as a custom by which Senators would support a
colleague who objected to an appointment to a federal office in
his state, provided the Senator and the President were of the
same party. It was only necessary for the Senator to state that
the nominee was personally obnoxious to him.13  This defini-
11. See HAmRs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 17-35; Morganston, The
Appointing and Removal Power of the President, S. REP. No. 172, 70th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1929).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 76 (Hamilton).
13. See HARaIs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 215-37; 2 HAYNES, THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 736-48 (1960).
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tion, however, is too narrowly drawn and too absolutely stated
to explain the practice prevailing since the 19301s.
Senatorial courtesy has come to mean that Senators will
give serious consideration and be favorably disposed to support
an individual Senator of the President's party who opposes a
nominee to an office in his state. But, as the Chief Clerk of
the Senate Judiciary Committee put it, "he just can't incant a
few magic words like 'personally obnoxious' and get away with
it. He must be prepared to fight, giving his reasons for opposing
the nominee." If his reasons are not persuasive or if he is not a
respected member of the Senate, he may lose.14
True, there are precious few cases where a Senator of the
Prsident's party lost a pitched battle to reject a nomination to
a federal office in his own state, but they do exist.15 Perhaps
it was critical and not coincidental to confirmation in these in-
stances that the other Senator from the state was also of the
President's party and a sponsor of the successful nominee. Fur-
ther, the possibility of losing a battle which might prove em-
barrassing to him makes a Senator careful to choose to fight
only those battles which he feels pretty sure of winning.16
More frequently, the fact that senatorial courtesy will not auto-
matically prevail, that there might be a messy fight and that
he might lose, prompts a Senator to seek accommodation with
the President. The President is similarly eager for accommoda-
tion because, from his vantage point, a Senator's opposition may
seem too formidable.'7
14. That it is not enough for a Senator to claim merely that a
nominee is personally obnoxious to insure Senate rejection was made
clear in an obviously carefully prepared statement delivered to the Sen-
ate in 1947 by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Alexander
Wiley, during the debate over the confirmation of the nomination of
Joe B. Dooley to be United States district judge for the northern district
of Texas. Senator O'Daniel of Texas had invoked the personally obnox-
ious doctrine. See 93 CONG. REC. 7991 (1947).
15. Mr. Dooley's appointment was confirmed, 93 CoNG. REc. 8421
(1947). Also, F. Roy Yoke's appointment as Collector of Internal Rev-
enue for West Virginia was confirmed in 1938, although Senator Holt of
West Virginia protested that he was personally obnoxious. See 83 CONG.
REC. 319-26 (1938).
16. Imagine, for example, the considerations which a Southern
Senator would have to take into account before attempting to block the
appointment to a federal district judgeship because the nominee was
not a devout segregationist. Many Senators from other parts of the
country could not afford politically to vote against confirmation, despite
the realization that breaches in the custom lessen their own power.
17. Former Deputy Attorney General Walsh has said "it is vir-
tually impossible to have a person confirmed for a federal judgeship
if one of the Senators from his state is either openly or secretly opposed
1966]
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To be fully appreciated, it must be understood that sena-
torial courtesy extends beyond the Senator of the President's
party objecting to an appointment to office in his own state.
Senators will sympathetically hear objections of a Senator who
is not of the President's party.'8 Also, they will give special
consideration to the protest of a Senator, particularly one of the
President's party, on an appointment to a national or circuit
post where the nominee comes from the Senator's state.19
Because the Senate has the power to confirm, Senators are
legally free to make whatever conventions they wish in exer-
cising this power. They could, for example, legally provide for
an automatic veto by any Senator to any presidential appoint-
ment. To a degree, then, current practice bears the marks of
self-restraint. This is not to imply that the President would be
powerless in the face of Senate opposition, for, as we shall see
shortly, he has impressive weapons to employ in a contest with
the Senate on an appointment.
As a result of senatorial courtesy, there developed a corol-
lary custom by which Senators of the President's party suggested
candidates to the President for federal offices in their home
states. If these candidates passed the President's muster, he ap-
pointed them. The basis for this custom was laid in Washing-
ton's administration. One of his nominees to a federal post in
Georgia was rejected by the Senate in courtesy to the Georgia
Senators. Washington yielded with a mild protest and ap-
pointed the nominee of the Georgia Senators.20 Had Washing-
ton, with his tremendous prestige, held his ground, he might
well have established a precedent which would have stunted the
growth of senatorial courtesy. When later Presidents sought to
reassert for the presidency the leading role in making appoint-
ments to federal offices within specific state boundaries, they
met with only limited success.2 '
Although some Presidents, and indeed, some Senators, have
tried to verbally punch the Senate into giving up the custom
of senatorial courtesy, the custom, albeit in modified form, retains
vitality.22 Senate devotion to the custom can readily be under-
stood in terms of self-interest. Over the years Senator propo-
to the nomination." Walsh, The Federal Judiciary, 43 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y
155, 156 (1960).
18. See HAm, s, op. cit. supra note 10, at 224.
19. Id. at 227.
20. Id. at 40-41.
21. Id. at 90-92, 93-98.
22. Id. at 91-92, 228-37.
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nents of senatorial courtesy have rationalized it on much the
same basis as Senator Douglas did in blocking two appointments
by President Truman:
[G]reat as the knowledge of a President may be, he cannot, in
the nature of things, in the vast majority of instances, know the
qualifications of the lawyers and local judges within a given
State as well as do the Senators from that State. However ex-
cellent his general knowledge, the President does not have the
detailed knowledge of the qualifications, background, and record
of judges in a particular State .... 23
In fact, neither a President nor a Senator is normally in a posi-
tion to know from his own knowledge whether or not a par-
ticular individual is a good nominee for a judicial post. The
question really is who has the better resources for gaining the
necessary information. The resources available to a President
clearly dwarf those available to a Senator. However, a Presi-
dent would not always make better appointments than a Senator
if each were a free agent because of the difference in personal
standards. For instance, in the Douglas-Truman controversy, it
would appear that Douglas' candidates were superior to those of
the President.2 4
It has become common to overexaggerate the role and power
of individual Senators in the matter of district court appoint-
ments.25 When a President chooses to inject himself into the
appointment of district judges, he can do so effectively, as Pres-
idents T. Roosevelt, Wilson and Hoover did.26 Even granting
that Senators of the party in power once may have owned dis-
trict judgeships, they have not under the last four Presidents.
Appointments are not made by Senators alone; other parties are
deeply involved. And, just as the legal power to confirm with
its corollary custom of courtesy provides a Senator with for-
midable practical power to employ toward securing a particular
nomination, other parties in interest have special powers which
can be used as counters. It does not follow that because in-
dividual Senators may be in a position to veto the appointment
of judges that they must do the appointing. In fact, close ex-
amination of the appointment process suggests other-wise.
2. The President: Expectations and Powers
Curiously, while knowledgeable people have considered it a
fact that Senators appointed district court judges, other knowl-
23. 97 CONG. REC. 12838 (1957).
24. See HARIus, op. cit. supra note 10, at 321-24.
25. See HAmus, op. cit. supra note 10, at 380; HAYxEs, SELEcTIoN AND
TENuRE OF JUDGEs 23 (1944).
26. See HARRIs, op. cit. supra note 10, at 91, 96, 317-18.
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edgeable people have been quick to hold the President respon-
sible for the quality and character of judicial appointments.2 7
Even the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary, well-versed in the ways of judicial appoint-
ments, publicly observed in 1962:
Great and deserved credit will adhere to the administration
if it finally breaks the bonds of partisanship and elevates the
judiciary to the level where mere patronage does not play so
major a role in appointments to the bench. The time is especial-
ly auspicious for the administration to forego substantially un-
balancing the judiciary any further, and to announce publicly
and unequivocally that a policy of bipartisanship has been adopt-
ed and will be further effectuated in the years ahead. [It also
acknowledged the role played by Senators.] 28
This is not to suggest that the President and his agents alone
are responsible for appointments to the federal bench but, rather,
to demonstrate that the President would be hard put to escape
all responsibility for appointments made in his name. Conse-
quently, Presidents generally have been very concerned that the
quality of appointments made during their incumbency be
high. This has been especially true of the last three administra-
tions. And, where a President wants to insure a high level of
appointments, he has legal powers which afford him considerable
coin with which to bargain with the Senators individually and
collectively. First, the President must submit the nomination
for formal consideration of the Senate. He is under no legal
compulsion to make nominations within a prescribed time limit.
He can, therefore, stall or refuse to fill a vacancy. In fact,
doing so may be very effective in forcing some concessions
from a Senator.29 Refusal to nominate can be particularly effec-
27. Editorial writers wise in the ways of government have written:
'"The heavy responsibility that thus necessarily falls on the President to
choose wise judges has been largely delegated during this Administra-
tion .... ." N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1961, p. 26, col. 2. "It seems to us
extremely unfortunate that the Kennedy administration has not made
more headway toward freeing the federal courts from the bondage to
political patronage. . . ." Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 6, 1961, p. 20,
col. 1. "The national goal must be to maintain the federal judiciary at
the highest possible level of ability and integrity .... The final respon-
sibility of course rests upon each national administration." St. Paul
Dispatch, May 5, 1965, p. 36, col. 2. "President Johnson has deliberately
rejected a splendid opportunity to make an outstanding appointment
to one of the most important courts in the entire Federal system .. .
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1965, p. 46, col. 2.
28. 87 A.B.A. REP. 601, 610 (1962).
29. Our courts are generally overburdened and behind in their
work. Leaving a judgeship unfilled creates difficulties for sitting judges
and lawyers who will usually pressure their recalcitrant Senator to seek
some kind of rapprochement with the Administration. How annoying
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rive when coupled with a suggestion leaked to the press that a
distinguished lawyer or state judge is the President's choice.
The Senator is then in the position of publicly opposing the
President's distinguished candidate, which may have a much
different impact in legal circles and on public opinion than in a
situation in which the only apparent candidate is the Senator's.
The pressure on a Senator may even be greater if both his and
the President's candidates are known and if there is feeling
among bar and press that the President's candidate is superior.
A second important presidential power is his constitutional
mandate "to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall ex-
pire at the End of their next Session." There has been stout
argument throughout our history as to what the word "happen"
means in this context. Some have argued that the President
could fill any vacancy which happened to exist during the re-
cess; others have urged that he could only fill those which hap-
pened to occur during the recess.30 In practice, Presidents tend
to take the broader view of their powers and fill both kinds
of vacancies. Recently, this practice received judicial sanction
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit.3
1
Congress as early as 1863 sought to discourage Presidents
delay can be to a Senator is manifested in this communication to the
Deputy Attorney General:
You have had my recommendation of L- for a Judgeship since
February 3. I am amazed to learn from your letter that you
hadn't even begun the F.B.I. check until July 7. There is no
legitimate basis for failing to move rapidly on L-.
I am as aware as you are of the difficulties of the Court Calen-
dar in the District, but I think I am entitled to insist that
your Department give fair and expeditious consideration to the
names I have pending before you ask for any others.
30. See HARIus, op. cit. supra note 10, at 255-57.
31. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962). The court
pointed out the practical difficulties in doing otherwise:
If petitioner is correct that the President's recess power is lim-
ited to vacancies which arise while the Senate is away, all
preparation [to screen candidates] must be telescoped into
whatever time remains in a session if the vacancy arises while
the Senate is in session. If a resignation or retirement is received
late in the session . . . the President must either forego the
opportunity of utilizing all available sources of information ...
or leave the office unfilled for months until the Senate recon-
venes. Even if this problem could be alleviated by suggesting
to judges that they notify the President considerably in advance
of anticipated resignations or retirements, we could hardly ex-
pect the President and Attorney General to possess prescience
so that they may predict when vacancies caused by death or un-
expected illness will occur.
Id. at 712.
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from making frequent use of the recess appointment by enact-
ing a provision reading: "nor shall any money be paid out of the
Treasury of the United States, as salary, to any person appointed
during the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy in any existing
office . .. until such appointee shall have been confirmed by
the Senate. '32 Current law on the subject is more carefully
drawn to withhold salary payment, with some exceptions, from a
recess appointee who was picked to fill a vacancy which "ex-
isted while the Senate was in session and was by law required
to be filled by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
until such appointee has been confirmed by the Senate .... ,,33
Although a recess appointment must still be confirmed by the
Senate, and despite the financial risk which the appointee may
run, a President sometimes may be able to obtain confirmation
for a sitting judge which might have been impossible had the
Senate acted before the appointee filled the post on a tem-
porary basis.34
Because of the prestige of his office and his access to the
mass media, the President can exert a powerful influence upon
public expectations as to judicial appointments which may, in
turn, affect the play leading to appointment. If the public
can be conditioned to expect high level appointments, it may be-
come poor politics for a Senator or state party leader to seek to
place men on the bench who do not measure up to the expecta-
tion. In such a case, a President may be hoisted with his own
petard, for he, too, may find it poor politics to make a particular
appointment if that appointment does not measure up to the
level of expectation he has helped to create. For example, when
it was rumored that "President Kennedy wants to name Boston
Municipal Judge Francis X. Morrissey, his former secretary and
a life long friend of the Kennedy family, to the single new fed-
eral judgeship now available in Massachusetts," members of the
Boston and Massachusetts bar associations and the press were
outraged because Morrissey seemed poorly qualified for the
post.35 Influential elements of the press were quick to point
32. 12 Stat. 646 (1863).
33. 54 Stat. 751 (1940), 5 U.S.C. § 56 (1964).
34. For example, in 1961 when the nomination of Judge Irving Ben
Cooper ran into a stormy controversy before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, the fact that he had been serving on an interim appointment was
very helpful, if not critical, to his cause. See Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of
Irving Ben Cooper, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
35. See Christian Science Monitor, July 14, 1961, p. 16, col. 3; N.Y.
Times, July 3, 1961, p. 5, col. 1.
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out the irony of a President considering the nomination of a
man who did not meet the standards for the office that the
President himself had set.36
3. The Deputy Attorney General
While George Washington could personally know virtually
all the outstanding people of his day and appoint men to judge-
ships who were known quantities to him, no modern President
can hope to do the same. If a President takes seriously his
legal responsibility for nominating and appointing federal judges,
the search for and screening of candidates requires more time
than he can personally give to it. But, even if he eschews a
major responsibility and is willing to have Senators name ap-
pointees, he will at least want to be sure that appointments
will not reflect adversely upon him. To obtain such assurance
requires a more intensive investigation than the President has
time to make. Consequently, it has become customary for the
President to assign his Attorney General the responsibility for
advising him as to judicial appointments. In turn, it has be-
come customary, at least in the last three administrations, for
the Attorney General to make it a primary responsibility of
the Deputy Attorney General to make recommendations for
such appointments. In the last two administrations, where
there were an unusually large number of judicial appointments
to be made, the day-to-day leg work of acquiring data on pro-
spective nominees and negotiating with Senators was assigned
by the Deputy to an assistant. The last two men to perform
these functions, Joseph Dolan (1961-1965), and Ernest C. Friesen,
36. Ibid. See also Chicago Daily Tribune, July 6, 1961, § 1, p. 16,
col. 2.
In its news item dealing with the Morrissey story, the Christian
Science Monitor pointedly recalled the words President Kennedy spoke
when he signed a bill adding new judgeships shortly after becoming
President: "I want to take this opportunity to say that for our federal
courts I shall choose men and women of unquestioned ability." Christian
Science Monitor, July 14, 1961, p. 16, col. 3. Later, when Morrissey's
nomination became a reality during the Johnson Administration, the
Washington Post lashed the President with these words:
The President ought to change his mind about nominating Judge
Francis X. Morrissey .... If it is too late to change his mind
about sending the nomination to the Senate, he ought to with-
draw it ....
The judicial appointments of this Administration have been
of a very high order. The Morrissey appointment is particularly
objectionable because it is in contrast with most of the court ap-
pointments that President Johnson has made....
Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1965, p. A14, col. 2.
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Jr. (1965- ), have been exceptionally capable, and have mark-
edly shaped and influenced the decisions of the Deputy.
Because the relationship between the Attorney General and
the Deputy must be close in an organizational and personal sense,
the Attorney General is kept apprised of important develop-
ments as the Deputy seeks to fashion a recommendation. At
any time, the Attorney General may indicate that he would like
the Deputy to proceed in a specific way. The Attorney General
may even make the initial suggestion as to a possible nominee,
asking the Deputy to check him out. Whatever communication
the Attorney General receives from Senators and others will
be passed on to the Deputy with or without comment.
To a lesser extent, the Attorney General will keep the Presi-
dent informed. If it appears that a particular recommendation
may cause difficulty with a Senator or party leaders, there may
be some discussion. Conversely, if the President has had com-
munications from a Senator or party leaders, he will relay the
information to the Attorney General with his comments. The
President can, of course, at any -time specify whom he wants
nominated and that settles the matter. But, Presidents rarely
do so; rather, Presidents generally are willing to have the At-
torney General make the recommendation. In the end, the Pres-
ident will take one good, hard look at the recommended nomina-
tion. At that point, the President may seek assurance from the
Attorney General that the nomination will stand up when it
goes to the Senate or that he has been informed of any antici-
pated difficulties and the reasons for making the nomination in
spite of them.37
Although the President or the Attorney General may at
any time direct the Deputy Attorney General to follow a pre-
scribed course of action or refuse to accept his recommendations,
the Deputy in practice plays the leading role in exercising the
President's power. In the last three presidencies, the office of
Deputy Attorney General has attracted men of extraordinary
ability: William P. Rogers, 1953-1957; Judge Lawrence E. Walsh,
1957-1961; Justice Byron P. White, 1961-1962; Nicholas de B.
Katzenbach, 1962-1965; Ramsey Clark, 1965- . Such men have
not been content to sit back and screen recommendations of-
fered by Senators. Whenever possible, they took the initiative
37. Some Presidents have further interviewed the particular can-
didate before submitting the nomination. See Rogers, Judicial Appoint-
ments in the Eisenhower Administration, 41 J. Am. JUD. Soc'y 38, 40
(1957).
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in seeking out and proposing candidates. As an assistant to one
of these Deputies put it: "we take all the ground the Senators
let us take." But there have been some very interesting dif-
ferences in degree of zeal with which Deputies have sought to
take ground, largely traceable to their respective President's gen-
eral attitude toward the Senate. The Eisenhower team was
much more aggressive in urging their own nominees on Senators
than the present team. Evidently President Johnson, as a con-
sequence of long years in the Senate, believes in senatorial pre-
rogative and is deferential where he can be. President Eisen-
hower, on the other hand, was not so impressed with senatorial
claims to appointments and backed his team strongly in their
efforts to take ground against Senators.
Thus, while the Deputy has no legal power in his own right
to make nominations, to the extent that he can influence
the Attorney General and the President, he can invoke the
President's power. This is known and understood by other
principals in the appointment process and it facilitates direct
negotiations between them and the Deputy.
4. The White House Staff
During the Kennedy administration, the contact between the
Attorney General and the President was very close and direct.
No member of the White House staff participated actively in
the process of judicial selection. Of course, members of the
staff who dealt with Senators liked to be informed of the prog-
ress of nominations. Shortly after Robert Kennedy's resignation,
however, President Johnson asked John Macy, the President's
Special Assistant on personnel matters and Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission, to review nominations suggested by
the Department of Justice. As Macy sees it, his function is to
maintain a kind of quality control. To this end, he endeavors to
have his office make an independent investigation and evalua-
tion of each suggested nominee.
One could speculate that the President's original purpose
in imposing a White House screening was merely to protect his
own political interests at a time when he could not be sure about
the political loyalties of the team at the Department of Justice.
38
But Macy feels that his search for men and women to fill im-
portant vacancies in Government must include judgeships, since
38. Recall how long President Johnson deliberated about elevating
Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, a Kennedy appointee,
to Attorney General.
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a person might well be considered a good prospect for both a
seat on the bench and a high administrative post at the same
time. Whatever the reasons, Macy and his small staff now take
a hard independent look at recommendations of the Depart-
ment.
5. The American Bar Association
In 1945 the American Bar Association established the Special
Committee on Federal Judiciary, later to become the Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary311 which passes on the qualifi-
cations of nominees to the federal bench. It has become custo-
mary for the Senate Judiciary Committee to consider these re-
ports from the ABA Committee.40 Further, the ABA Commit-
tee customarily submits an informal report to the Department
of Justice on any person the Department is seriously consider-
ing for appointment. The Committee will indicate whether a
particular person is "Exceptionally Well Qualified," "Well Quali-
fied," "Qualified," or "Not Qualified" for a judicial post. Needless
to say, the Committee has a profound impact on the selection
process. As experience attests, a rating of "Not Qualified" will
not necessarily mean that a particular man will be withdrawn
from consideration, but no administration is eager to have very
many of its appointments so classified. For this reason, the
ABA Committee is significantly involved in the selection process.
6. The Senate Judiciary Committee
Senate rules require that the Judiciary Committee pass on
all nominations to the federal bench and make recommendations
to the Senate. Customarily, a subcommittee holds hearings on
all such nominations, but in most cases the hearing is perfunc-
tory. The Committee members do not regard it as their function
to actively help select judges. Rather, they regard themselves
as watchdogs, safeguarding the interests of the public and the
Senators, individually and collectively.
To safeguard the interests of individual Senators, the Com-
mittee checks with the Senators of the state where the nominee
will hold his post, in the case of a district judge, or the Senators
of the state where the nominee is from, if he is to serve on a
39. See Segal, Federal Judicial Selection - Progress and the Prom-
ise of the Future, 46 MASS. L.Q. 138-39 (1961). See generally Gross-
MAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 82-196 (1965), for a detailed description of
the Committee and its operation.
40. See Segal, supra note 39, at 138-39.
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circuit, special, or District of Columbia court. With rare excep-
tion, the Committee tends to support an individual Senator who
objects to a nominee. The Committee reviews the report from
the ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary. In addition, the chair-
man is apprised of the information developed by the FBI investi-
gation of the nominee on behalf of the Department of Justice.
Also, the Committee provides an opportunity through open hear-
ings for anyone to object to a nomination, offering whatever
evidence he may have that the nominee is not fit for the post.
Some effort is made to keep such testimony relevant and respon-
sible, but the Committee is very generous in allowing people to
be heard.
The Committee can affect the selection process markedly in
three ways. First, it can delay Senate action on confirmation in
the hope of embarrassing the President or testing his deter-
mination to make a particular appointment. Delay may be used
to afford the Committee or individual members the opportunity
to seek Senate support in opposing the nomination.41 Although
effective at times, delay is not effective against a determined
President who can expect support from a majority of the
Senators. If the Judiciary Committee as a whole refuses to act,
a majority of the Senate can take the matter out of the Com-
mittee's hands via a discharge petition.
41. President Kennedy's nomination of Judge Thurgood Marshall,
a Negro who had served many years as special counsel for the NAACP,
and the events which followed, provide a good example of the use of
delay by some Committee members. Marshall was originally nominated
September 23, 1961. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1962, p. 1. A few weeks later,
October 6, 1961, he was made a recess appointment. Nothing was done
by the Committee about the appointment until May of 1962. Then,
hearings were held before a subcommittee selected by Senator Eastland
of Mississippi. Two of the three subcommittee members were South-
erners: Johnston of South Carolina and McClellan of Arkansas (the
other member was Hruska of Nebraska). Hearings Before a Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Nomination of Thurgood
Marshall, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). When the subcommittee failed to
report, the full Committee under tremendous political pressure bypassed
the subcommittee and voted to recommend confirmation on September
7, 1962. N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1962, p. 1, col. 3. A few days later the
Senate confirmed the appointment. Perhaps, the Chairman and other
southern members only hoped to demonstrate to their constituencies that
they were opposed to the nomination, for the odds seemed poor that in
this particular case they would be able to embarrass or discourage the
President or pick up enough Senate support to reject the nomination.
Although it could be argued that this was one of those rare instances
where Committee members were using the Committee to serve their
personal interest, the Southerners may have felt that they were acting
in the public interest by trying to prevent a poor appointment.
19661
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
A second way in which the Committee can affect the selec-
tion process is through Committee hearings. These hearings
afford the Senators-individually and collectively-their best
means for influencing judicial selection by attuning the Senate as
a whole, the press, and the public to the objections against a
nominee. Committee members can dispel or enhance this in-
formational process significantly by their arrangement and ques-
tioning of witnesses.42 In the sense that the Senate Judiciary
Committee's hearings provide an opportunity to expose real or
alleged weaknesses of nominees, they can exert a powerful in-
fluence on the conduct of parties to the nomination process.
In the same fashion, Senate debate over confirmation affords
still a third opportunity for Senators to seek to embarrass the
administration by questioning the wisdom of a particular ap-
pointment. Here, individual members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee who have dissented from the majority's recommenda-
tion can be expected to play a leading role, for they will have a
familiarity with the nominee's record. A Senator who is unable
or unwilling to invoke senatorial courtesy can still throw some
telling punches. Such action will rarely defeat a nomination,
but the prospect of denunciation on the Senate floor may weigh
heavily in the deliberations of appointing principals.
7. The FBI Report
As a matter of course, the Department of Justice requests
FBI investigation of serious contenders for nomination to federal
judicial posts. In addition to seeking information on the char-
acter of the person, FBI investigators interview lawyers and
judges to get an indication of the professional standing of the
42. Appointment makers view with foreboding the prospect of a
public hearing in which their candidate may be denounced by the of-
ficial representative of the ABA Committee in the following way: "I
was given substantial evidence of unjudicial conduct on the special
sessions bench, involving tantrums, excoriation of counsel, and general
lack of poise on the part of Judge Cooper .... [m]y informants gave
me .. .testimony . . .to the effect that Judge Cooper lacked judicial
temperament." Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on the Nomination of Irving Ben Cooper, 87 Cong., 2d Sess. 40
(1962). And where Herbert Brownell, president of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York and a former Attorney General of the
United States testified: "I conclude, if ever a clear case of lack of
judicial temperament existed, this is it. If ever a candidacy for judge-
ship called for refusal of confirmation, I respectfully submit this is the
case." Id. at 206. It is true that Cooper was confirmed in spite of this
cannonade, but it is a safe bet that those who were instrumental in se-
curing the nomination for Judge Cooper were chary about getting in-
volved soon in another such donnybrook.
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possible nominee. The merits of such a custom are obvious;
federal judges should be men of unassailable integrity. FBI
agents are in a position to interview a wide variety of people
who may be able to provide information about a man's char-
acter, information which would not come to light in the investi-
gation conducted by the ABA's Committee.43
A report from the FBI which is considered to be adverse is
lethal to a candidacy. But what are the criteria of an adverse
report? Bear in mind that FBI agents collect and report what-
ever information is given them by those they interview. They
attempt to verify important allegations against the person being
investigated, but they will not delete such allegations from their
report even if they seem insubstantial. This may seem a dubious
practice, but its virtues become manifest when one examines the
reason for it which J. Edgar Hoover articulated to a Senate sub-
committee years ago:
I think that when the time comes that the Bureau must de-
cide what shall go into a report and what shall not go into a
report, then we are functioning as a Gestapo. I think we must
report accurately and in detail what any person tells us ....
In the reports we submit to other agencies, we do report on the
reliability of the source of information, if we know it.44
Also, it is important to note that the FBI does not evaluate its
own reports. Rather it acts solely as an impartial fact-gathering
agency.45 Consequently, the evaluation of the FBI report on a
candidate for the judiciary is made by Department of Justice
officials. Thus, the question of what kinds of information make
a report adverse and what kinds of criteria are employed are
matters for them to decide, at least initially. Solid evidence of
personal dishonesty or meaningful association with racketeers
or subversives will, without question, be regarded as adverse.
But beyond that, Department officials have never established
clear-cut criteria, each report being evaluated on an ad hoc
basis. In general, the standard employed appears to be whether
the report "shocks the conscience" of the officials in the Depart-
ment of Justice or, perhaps, whatever. they feel would shock
Senators, the press, and the public. To gome, an illicit romance
43. Investigating lawyers- could, -for example; thoroughly* investi-
gate a man's professional activities without uncovering the fact that he
has a clandestine relationship with some 'racketeers.
44. F.B.I., Testimony of the Director on February 3 and February
7, 1950 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations Regarding
the 1951 Appropriations Estimate for the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion (mimeo).
45. Hoover, The Confidential Nature of FBI Reports, 8 SYRAcuss
L. RE V. 2 (1956).
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of any kind might be enough to take a contender out of con-
sideration. To others, it might not, if the principals were dis-
creet.
46
Despite its virtues, the FBI investigation raises some specters.
J. Edgar Hoover has consistently, and for good reasons, taken
the position that FBI files must be confidential.47 Aside from
appropriate officers in the appropriate agencies, no one, in-
cluding Senators, except under very special circumstances, is
allowed to see the FBI files. In this connection, the Depart-
ment of Justice has worked out a procedure for transmitting file
information to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee.48 Individual Senators can obtain only whatever file in-
formation the Department of Justice officials or the Chairman
of the Judiciary Committee are willing to tell them. Conse-
quently, it would be possible for Department officials, in jockey-
ing for position with a Senator over a particular nomination, to
indicate that the man had been removed from contention because
of an adverse FBI report. The suggestion of an adverse FBI re-
port clearly carries an aura of incontrovertibility and finality
which might well make a Senator feel that he should drop the
matter. Actually, such allusions could be groundless and merely
a daring maneuver to head off a nomination to which the real
objection was lack of competence but where a Senator could be
46. One situation which some time ago caused consternation in the
Justice Department involved a contender who, it was alleged, had helped
trap a wife into an illicit situation fcr a divorce proceeding. Signifi-
cantly, despite misgivings, Department officials did not feel that they
could oppose the nomination on those grounds alone, for in other re-
spects the candidate checked out well.
47. Hoover, supra note 45, at 4.
48. An officer of the Department, normally the Executive Assistant
to the Deputy Attorney General but sometimes the Assistant Deputy
Attorney General, calls on the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee with the F.B.I. file of a nominee which the Committee is to con-
sider. The officer gives an oral resume of anything in the file which
might possibly be considered derogatory and answers any question the
Chairman may ask by way of clarification. If the Chairman wishes to
look at the file, he will do so but only in the presence of the officer.
In some rare instances, another member of the Committee, who has
been serving on the subcommittee dealing with a particular nomination,
has been allowed to see the file, but only in the presence of the Depart-
ment of Justice officer. Under no circumstances is the file ever left
with the Chairman or other committeemen. As a practical matter,
therefore, the members of the Judiciary Committee only know what the
Chairman wishes to tell them. This, of course, does not prevent persons
outside the government who oppose the nomination from supplying
committee members with derogatory information which may be iden-
tical with that in the file.
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expected to effectively counter such an objection.49 Because of
the requirement of confidentiality of FBI reports, it is usually
not possible to confront a nominee in an open hearing before the
Senate Judiciary Committee with derogatory information and
allow him to defend himself. In short, the only check on an
adverse report is a Senator's zeal and persistence, and this can
only be brought into play when a Senator is interested in a
candidacy.
B. PRESSURES AT WoRK
Every candidate for major political office, however great
his own resources are, needs help from others in his campaigns.
People, in large numbers, jump into the fray expecting no per-
sonal favors. They may feel ideologically that it is important for
a particular candidate or party to win. They may need the
kind of stimulation and fulfillment they obtain by participation
in the rough and tumble of a campaign. Or they may become
involved out of a sense of duty or the idea that a good citizen
should participate. Others, however, give of their time and
money with the full expectation that, should their candidate
win, they will have a good claim to favors. The favors sought
frequently are public offices. It is axiomatic that one path to
appointive office is to ingratiate oneself with those who hold
the appointing power. Baldly stated, the axiom has disturbing
overtones. One implication is that appointments are obtained
as a quid pro quo for service rendered without regard for qualifi-
cations. Looking at it from another perspective, a person work-
ing in a campaign has a unique opportunity to demonstrate his
ability to a candidate. If the candidate wins and then has the
opportunity to appoint or help appoint to high office, he has a
coterie who have demonstrated that they are like-minded as to
political philosophy and are capable. What is more natural in
such a situation than to seek to place such people in high gov-
ernmental posts?5 0 To the degree that an appointment is made
on qualifications and ability, it is inaccurate to describe it as a
49. In fairness, Justice Department officials assert this could never
happen, that Senators will persist in finding out in general "what you
have on my man," and in many cases they are already familiar with
the facts which constitute the "derogatory" information and do not feel
that it is critical.
50. This phenomenon, in a sense, is not unique to politics. In
business, academic or other endeavors, it is common for someone, upon
attaining high office, to seek to find places in his organization for people
with whom he has worked before and for whom he has a high regard.
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purely political appointment. But political considerations lay
enormous pressures on the appointment makers.
At one time, fresh from his experience of steering the presi-
dential campaign of Franklin D. Roosevelt to victory, James A.
Farley had the temerity to suggest that he could keep a party
together and working effectively without patronage: "I am con-
vinced that with the help of a few simple ingredients like time,
patience, and hard work, r could construct a major political party
in the United States without the aid of a single job to hand out
to deserving partisans."51 If it is possible to do so, not many
professional politicians believe it. Rather, they believe it is im-
perative to use appointments to high office to encourage the
future participation of others. Consequently, the party profes-
sionals will pressure appointment makers to reward the faithful.
Rewarding the faithful has become so much a part and parcel of
our system that it would be fair to say that it has the signifi-
cance and meaning of custom; appointment makers are expected
to follow custom and are under pressure to do so. However
much an appointment maker might want to make his selection on
merit alone, he cannot ignore custom without risk of sparking
great discontent among the professionals in his party. Appoint-
ment makers are not unaware of the limitations set for them,
however much they might desire to mitigate their influence.
A kind of practical compromise is often effected by an approach
suggested by an appointment maker in this way: "We feel that
we owe certain people jobs but we do not feel that we owe them
specific jobs." In elaboration, he explained, no one is promised
a judgeship for services rendered nor will anyone be appointed
to a judgeship if he does not have the qualifications for the post.
But there is a frank recognition that it is incumbent upon the
appointment makers to take care of those who contributed heav-
ily to the efforts of the past campaign and that somewhere in
the vast spectrum of posts available they can find a spot becom-
ing to the talents of those who have a substantial claim to con-
sideration.
The essence of these observations is this: Appointment mak-
ers are cofistrained 16 appoint to judgeships those who have
rendered service to the President or to the Senator(s) from his
state, if of the President's party, or to the President's party gen-
erally. There is, however, freedom to pick and choose among
the faithful for specific jobs.52
51. FARLEY, BEHIND THE BALLOTS 237 (1938).
52. Byron White's forthright statements, when he was Deputy At-
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Unfortunately, there is no quick litmus paper test to divine
who is the most deserving of the deserving. People active in
the party and campaigns all have their own notions as to who
has done most for the cause. There is a further complication
in the fact that in our system it is possible for someone to per-
form Herculean tasks in behalf of the candidacy of a President
without doing much or anything for a Senator's candidacy or
vice versa. Thus, the chief appointment makers, the appropriate
Senator and those who represent the President, may feel a
strong obligation to and admiration for two different men, both
of whom have labored hard in party vineyards. But neither the
Senator nor the presidential advisors can safely take into ac-
count only their own estimates of a potential appointee's con-
tributions to the party's efforts if they want to insure future
support for themselves and keep the party sinews strong. They
must consult with party leaders in the state and make it clear
that they have given consideration to their views. The extent
to which a party leader's views will receive consideration de-
pends in large part upon his real or apparent power in party
circles.5 3 In the reckoning of Senators and the presidential
advisors, the views of Governors and Congressmen of their
own party normally must be given special consideration. The
views of the Vice President and cabinet officers with regard to
appointments in their respective states, if they retain a lively
interest in state politics, will also be influential. Finally, the
views of local and national party committeemen will be sought.
These people will in turn be importuned by lesser lights in the
party who feel that their efforts in the party's behalf entitle
them to some consideration from party leaders.
1. Pressure from Candidates
It is often said in respect to honorific posts of all kinds, in
government and out, that the post should seek the man. Perhaps
this is the ideal, but it does not describe what happens with
torney General, are very much to the point. He told the American Bar
Association House of Delegates that "there is nothing odious about the
preference for Democrats," that the selection of judges is a "political
process in the best sense of those words," and that "the central question
in choosing them [the appointees] was ability, not politics." Minnea-
polis Star, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 14A, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1962, p. 21,
col. 6.
53. For example, a Justice Department official in a Democratic
administration makes it clear that in making judicial appointments to
the district courts in Illinois, "Mayor Daley of Chicago must have a seat
at the conference table."
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judicial appointments. Rarely does a person who has not ac-
tively sought the appointment receive it. Even the most distin-
guished jurists have actively sought their nominations.
For lawyers and state judges in virtually all jurisdictions,
save perhaps the southern district of New York, a federal judge-
ship is a highly sought after prize. The pay is, by most people's
standards, substantial. And, when coupled with life tenure and
a most favorable retirement arrangement, these judgeships be-
come very attractive.
To lawyers, there are special attractions which transcend
financial benefits. For them, it is hard to conceive of more
important or prestigious positions; judges are kings in their
courtrooms and they are treated accordingly inside and outside
the courtroom. 54 Illustrative of the importance and prestige
of being a judge is the answer this writer received when he
respectfully asked a distinguished and elderly appeals court
judge, "Why, in view of the favorable retirement plan, don't
more judges retire at age seventy?" His answer was as simple
as it was profound: "When you are an active judge, you are
somebody. When you are a retired judge, you are nobody."
In order to be in serious contention for a judgeship, an
aspirant must usually make it clear that he wants the post. He
can do this in a variety of ways, ranging from very active cam-
paigning in his own behalf to having others do it for him. Ef-
forts can be made by the candidate or those working in his be-
half to bring pressure to bear on the appointment makers
through political leaders. Obviously, it is to a candidate's ad-
vantage to have a record of active support in the campaigns of
the President or the appropriate Senator or for the party gen-
erally, for then a good case can be made that the candidate is
owed special consideration. 5
54. To get some feel for a judge's standing among lawyers it is
recommended to the nonlawyer that he attend a bar association meeting
or a law school alumni banquet and observe the respect, and in some
cases the obsequiousness, lawyers manifest for the judges.
55. This point was well made by Judge Samuel Perry in a humor-
ous and candid speech in which he told the Chicago Bar Association in
1951 how he became a federal judge:
Since we are talking confidentially I will be perfectly frank
with you folks in admitting that I tried to obtain the appoint-
ment seven years ago and learned then that it requires not one
but two Senators. At that time I was out of politics and they
did not need me. Therefore, I decided that this time if I wanted
that appointment I had better get back into politics-which I
did....
MURPHY & PMTCHETT, COURTS, JUDGES AND PoLrnIcs 95 (1961).
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When a candidate has not made such a record, he must rely
more heavily on the backing of those in the party who seek
support of his candidacy on the basis of consideration due them.
If he is not a member of the President's party, it becomes
necessary to convince party leaders that in this particular situa-
tion it is good politics to appoint someone of the other party.
Sitting federal judges will be frequently drawn into the cam-
paign in spite of the myth that judges must and do refrain
from involvement in the political processes. This involvement
will be discussed shortly.
Aspirants invariably seek to enlist the aid of local and state
bar association groups to help pressure the appointment makers.56
Presumably, state political leaders and Senators cannot afford
to ignore the advice of local and state bar associations. Wher-
ever and in whatever manner possible, candidates will, of course,
endeavor to marshal support from the press.
57
56. The Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American Bar As-
sociation does not solicit the views of the local and state bar associations
as such. Therefore, it is frequently the case that someone who has re-
ceived the endorsement of those groups will not be rated as qualified
by the ABA Committee.
57. The following letter from a former distinguished district judge
to his Senator, written at a time when he was seeking nomination, is
illustrative of how hard candidates normally campaign for the office,
even if they try to convey the impression, as this particular letter writer
did, that they have "hardly moved a muscle." In reading the letter bear
in mind that neither the candidate nor the Senators of the state were of
the President's party and take note of the involvement of federal judges.
Dear Senator J-:
As you suggested at my pleasant visit at your home Sunday,
I give you herewith a confirmatory memorandum.
In the first place, the matter was a great surprise to me.
In fact, when Chief Judge P- of the Federal Circuit spoke to
me. . ., I gratefully declined.
But, when he and Chief Judge L- of the District Court
again talked with me .. ., and when I found that our good
friend Judge X-[the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court]
was in accord, I reconsidered. For, ... the Federal judiciary
have ... the most interesting judicial jurisdiction in the entire
country, which to my mind outweighs the salary loss.
From then on they have taken the matter in hand, while I,
whether wisely or not, have hardly moved a muscle, save to
talk to you and Senator Z-[the other Senator from the state],
who has been an intimate friend for years.
Judge L- has, however, kept me advised.... [H] e and
Judge P- went to see Chief Justice M- [of the United States
Supreme Court], who expressed unusual interest, and indicated
he might, perchance, contact the highest quarters. Thereupon,
Judge L- visited the Deputy Attorney General A-, in charge
of such matters for the Attorney General, and a long-time friend.
He told - he felt a Republican appointment to one, at least,
of the two vacancies in the state would be good Democratic
politics, since there are now but two active Republican federal
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2. Pressure of State Tradition
Frequently, state tradition makes for political pressures
which appointment makers can ignore only at peril to them-
selves and the party. It is sometimes traditional for judge-
ships to be divided on a geographical basis or to be spread
among the constituent nationality groups in the state. To upset
the usual balance may create the impression among a minority
group that the appointment makers are hostile to them. Con-
sequently, appointment makers are sometimes in the position
where failure to make a particular appointment may be misin-
terpreted to their political disadvantage. 58
judges in the entire circuit. In this view I think you told me
the Attorney General himself concurred.
Then Judge L- got Judge M- of [another] Federal Court
of Appeals, and my predecessor as Chairman of the ... commit-
tee of the American Bar Associaticn, to write Assistant Attorney
General H-, and Judge P-, in turn, wrote the Attorney Gen-
eral. For your information, I enclose copies of the above-men-
tioned letters and my "Who's Who."
Furthermore, Judge L- communicated with Judge C-, of
the Court of Appeals, who is such a long-time friend of the
President that he always stays at the White House when he
visits Washington. Judge C- came to know me as my successor
as Chairman of the ABA Committee, and he promptly wrote L-
that he would take the matter up with the President personally,
and "present it in the most favorable manner that I know." Un-
fortunately, Judge C- is a very sick man unable to leave his
home, and as yet has, therefore, been unable to talk to the Presi-
dent .... Doubtless, however, he will shortly take the matter
up personally otherwise, if he has not done so already. I hope to
have word on this shortly, and will immediately advise you, since
I would think it desirable, though perhaps not necessary, for this
to precede even a follow-up news article on a Republican ap-
pointment, as to which I gathered you thought you might ap-
propriately contact Mr. D- [newspaper publisher].
Meanwhile-and altogether-I have talked with but two
close personal friends; (1) F-, because of his letter to you, who
will help on the Democratic angle; (2) W-, President of the
X.Y. Bank, who serves with me on the board of a foundation,
both of them being very glad to help. W- has already spoken
with N- [President of a university in the state] and I-[Presi-
dent of a large bank in the state]. Both will be glad to write
the President.
Judge X- [Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court]
thinks it would be a good idea to have the State Bar Association
go on record favoring a Republican appointment to at least
one of the two vacancies. Do you concur in this?
Yours very truly,
58. For example, in one district it had become customary to ele-
vate the United States Attorney to the district bench when a vacancy
occurred. At the time of one such vacancy, the United States Attorney
was of the Jewish faith. When there was speculation that someone else
might be appointed, the Senators from the state and the Department of
Justice were deluged with communications pointing out that the con-
siderable Jewish community in the state would regard it as a deliberate
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3. The Pressure of Good Politics
Running counter to the pressures described above is the
pressure that is sometimes generated by the idea that it is good
politics to avoid the usual political considerations in selecting
judges. For example, there is no doubt that a Democratic
President will be hailed in many quarters for nominating out-
standing Republicans to the bench. It is sometimes good politics
to appoint an extraordinary lawyer or state judge to the bench
regardless of political considerations. Consequently, the ap-
pointment makers occasionally bow to such considerations in
making a particular appointment even in the face of anguished
wails from party regulars. This can be done more easily in
situations where package deals can be made. Thus, if there are
three openings in a particular state, the President's men may
propose a slate which would include two nominations which
the Senators and state party leaders are eager to see named and
a nonpartisan or opposing party member for the third. It will
then be suggested that agreement be reached on the slate as a
whole. To bring a concession in these circumstances is easier, at
least relatively so, than it would be if there were only one post
available. It is noteworthy that President Kennedy's advisors
felt that it was imperative in overcoming resistance to Republi-
can appointments that the first be made in the President's own
state. As a Department of Justice official suggested, the Presi-
dent and his representatives knew that in urging Senators and
state party leaders to consider Republican appointments they
would be asked to establish the President's bona fides by doing
in his state what he was asking them to do.
Unfortunately, however, recent selections made as a conse-
quence of the pressure of good politics have proven to be the
exception and not the rule.
4. Pressure from Sitting Judges
Although pressure from sitting judges is rarely a decisive
factor in the appointment of judges, it cannot be ignored. It is
generally supposed that sitting judges with meticulous regard
for the separation of powers would not actively seek to influence
the appointment makers; in fact, however, they do. Judges are
affront if the custom were broken when a Jew happened to be the
United States Attorney. It became apparent to the appointment makers
that as a practical matter they had little choice but to elevate the United
States Attorney, who achieved an outstanding and lengthy record of
service.
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consulted by officials in the Justice Department and by the ABA
Committee in regard to prospective nominees. What is perhaps
more surprising is that frequently judges will take it upon
themselves to urge a candidacy without waiting to be consulted.
If the judge is a Learned Hand or a prestigious member of the
Supreme Court, a strong letter may have a profound impact on
the appointment makers, particularly where the field has been
narrowed to a few choices. 59 Often, however, a judge will mani-
fest an uneasiness or self-consciousness which undoubtedly re-
flects feelings of guilt about becoming involved in promoting a
candidate.
C. THE INTERPLAY OF FORCES IN THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS
1. District Courts
The appointment process cannot be described adequately as
a series of formal and automatic steps. An appointment grows
out of the interaction of a number of people with varying and,
to some extent, countervailing powers attempting to influence
each other within a framework imposed on them by law, custom,
and tradition.
Once it is known that there is or will be a vacancy on the
federal bench, the jockeying for position begins in earnest. Some
groundwork undoubtedly will have been laid far in advance.
Some provident aspirants may have established themselves by
their political activity in anticipation of the day when the op-
portunity would surely arise. The President, at the beginning
of his administration, will have indicated implicitly or explicitly
59. Imagine the impact of a letter from Learned Hand which states
in part:
I think there have been not more than two occasions during the
long period that I have served as a judge when I felt it per-
missible to write a letter in favor of anyone for a judicial ap-
pointment. However, I feel so strongly that the Second Circuit
would be greatly benefited by the appointment of Mr. X- that
I cannot refrain from writing you to express my hope that you
may see fit to fill the vacancy now existing in the Circuit by
selecting him. .
Or consider the impact of a letter from an outstanding member of the
Supreme Court which elaborates in great detail on his general estimate
of a candidate:
In view of my close concern during practically the whole of my
professional life with the quality of the federal bench, I venture
to commend to your favorable consideration Mr. Y- Y- is
one of those rare creatures whose talents and capabilities so far
exceed those of even able men that in talking of him one must
indulge in conscious understatement in order to avoid disbelief
on the part of those who have not had intimate experience with
his capacities ....
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what he wishes done with respect to appointments. His men in
the Department of Justice will have been actively or passively
collecting names and information about good prospects. The
appropriate Senators will have been importuned from time to
time with suggestions for future judicial appointments. If there
has been a recent appointment to a post in a particular state,
all parties to the nomination process have in mind the also-rans,
some of whom must be contenders for the next vacancy. A
large percentage of nominees have been considered one or more
times before actually being designated.
While the aspirants have others generate support for their
candidacy, the President's men in the Justice Department can-
vass people whom they know, in and outside of the Department,
as to qualified candidates. Strategic in this situation are mem-
bers in the Department who have or are thought to have special
knowledge about lawyers in their native states. They may recite
the virtues of particular individuals from memory or they
may contact people back home and relay the information so gar-
nered. Others who have worked in the political hustings with
the crucial Department officials will also be queried. Or as is
frequently the case, they will not wait to be queried but will
offer gratuitous advice.
At the same time, the Senators of the President's party
will be actively or passively collecting information on candidates.
In regard to district judgeships, there are several courses of
action available to a Senator. Some Senators, such as Frank
Lausche (D. Ohio) and the late Harry Byrd (D. Va.) do not
like to play an active role in judicial selection. They feel that
the appointment of judges is the President's constitutional job
and that for them to ask the President to appoint their candi-
dates would be akin to asking favors for themselves. They do,
of course, feel that they have the right to oppose a Presidential
nomination, if they do not like it. Consequently, in such situa-
tions the initiative lies with the officials in the Department of
Justice. Nevertheless, the Department will still clear a prospec-
tive nominee with the Senator before formally proposing him
in order to avoid confirmation problems.
A much larger number of Senators will submit a list of
candidates and suggest to the Department that any one of those
named on the list will be acceptable to them, inviting the De-
partment to make the selection. The reason for such an ap-
proach can be readily understood. As the old saying goes, "In
making an appointment, you make fifty enemies and one in-
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grate." By drawing up a list and placing the onus for decision
on the Department, a Senator can satisfy more and disappoint
fewer candidates. As indicated earlier, the team at the De-
partment of Justice is happy to move into the breach and make
the selections. But Senators who submit lists do not always do
so for the purpose of letting the President's men pick and choose;
some use the list as camouflage. For, while they send a letter
with the list to the Department with copies for all interested
parties, they call upon or phone officials to indicate who their
real choice is.60
Most Senators feel that if they are of the President's party,
they should designate the nominee subject to the approval of
the Department of Justice. Some even take the proprietary
view that they own the job. For example, one Senator wrote to
the Attorney General listing five names and saying: "On the
basis of your investigation and survey, I shall make my final
choice of the nominee . . . ." The President's agents bristle at
the suggestion that they only investigate and check on candi-
dates for the Senators.
60. The following exchange of letters gives a good indication of
why it is useful for a Senator to submit a list pro forma even if the
Senator knows from the start whom he would like to see named. It is
easier to stave off recriminations where there is an appearance of due
consideration and a decision on the merits, or so some Senators think.
Interestingly enough, and to support this view, recipients of such sen-
atorial assurance, however cynical about the selection process, tend to
believe their own Senator. Evidence of this is the fact that they will
bother to write letters, assemble requested data and seek support at
the bidding of a Senator even when it is a poorly kept secret that he
has made up his mind. A candidate for a district judgeship wrote to his
senator:
I respectfully request that I be considered as a candidate for
the appointment to the Federal Judgeship vacancy ....
I am certain you are acquainted with my political background;
this background is strongly Republican and I have always been
active in furthering the interests of the Republican party. I
have been a precinct committeeman and have served as County
Republican Chairman. I will have the support of the -
County Bar Association; the Republican County Committee and
numerous prominent lawyers of our state. I also have the as-
surance of active support by Congressman R- and other prom-
inent and influential Republicans in the state.
The Senator replied:
I have made no commitments and have done nothing further on
the matter than to indicate to all interested persons that they
send me biographical data and background so that I might have
it before me when the time comes to resolve and determine this
appointment.
There are quite a number of applicants and I want everyone to
feel that I shall undertake to be as fair and impartial as I pos-
sibly can in resolving this matter.
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When a Senator feels strongly about what he considers to be
his prerogative, the President's men may have considerable dif-
ficulty thwarting his attempt to impose on them an unfavorable
nominee. Thus, it is understandable why there is a ready dis-
position in the Department to accept a good suggestion for nomi-
nee from the Senator without much question. If there are two
Senators of the President's party from a particular state, De-
partment arithmetic has it that the effect of two Senators want-
ing a particular man for a district judgeship in their state is
more than one plus one. The sum is more like infinity, for it
would only be with great trepidation that the President's men
would attempt to counter the will of both Senators.
Interestingly enough, the fact that two Senators are involved
may give the President's men a wedge for taking more ground
in the appointment process. If the Senators are not agreed on a
candidate, as is frequently the case, the President's men can
jockey suggestions to them trying to find a nominee who is their
choice primarily but acceptable to both Senators. In such situa-
tions, it is important for the President's men not to convey the
impression to either Senator that they have favored the candidate
of the other. But Senators are not unaware of the effectiveness
of these divide and conquer tactics and many of them will seek
to work out an arrangement with the other Senator from their
state so that they will always appear to make common cause on
appointments. The easiest device for doing so is to split up ap-
pointments, including nonjudicial appointments.
Despite the efficacy of presenting a united front, some Sena-
tors are so estranged politically from the other Senator of the
state that they just cannot work out a satisfactory arrangement.
The American electorate apparently has no overpowering alle-
giance to either party or political ideology. And, even where the
Senators are nominally of the same party, it is possible for them
to be far apart politically.
As indicated previously, when a Senator or two Senators of
the state has or have settled on a candidate, the President's
agents are predisposed to accept him, unless they feel he does
not meet their standard for character and competence. But this
does not mean that they have played a passive role. Operating
on the basis that "you can't beat someone with no one," the
President's men frequently take initiative in proposing candi-
dates to the Senator. It may turn out that all interested par-
ties have had the same person in mind all along. But such
initiative on the part of Department officers may put the Sena-
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tor in the dual position of presenting his own candidate while
actively opposing the man suggest'ed by the Department. This
can become embarrassing for the Senator if word is leaked to
the press as to whom the Department is considering and the
state press finds the Department's choice worth lauding. The
Senator is then placed on the defensive locally. His position
may be untenable if the Department has fixed on a prestigious
lawyer or state judge who has considerable support in his own
right among party and bar leaders in the state.
The Senators, however, have a counter strategy. If a Sena-
tor beats the Department and issues a press release stating that a
particular person will be the next federal district judge, he has
placed his own prestige on the line. For the presidential as-
sistants to contest the Senator's choice at this point involves the
politically important issue of face-saving. It is, however, a dar-
ing maneuver, for should the Department oppose his choice and
it turns out that they have good grounds for doing so, the
Senator will have difficulty saving face. On the other hand, the
President's men may prefer to swallow hard and take the Sena-
tor's man without contest, in preference to embarrassing him.
This is particularly true if the Senator is regarded as powerful. 1
When several appointments are to be made to the bench
in a particular state, the Department and the Senators may be
able to compromise. For example, in the Kennedy Administra-
tion, it was easier to get Senators to accept a Republican ap-
61. Senatorial strategy in the use of the premature press release
was described and decried by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. That news-
paper editorialized, after Senator Stuart Symington announced he would
recommend James H. Meredith, his former campaign manager, for nom-
ination to a district judgeship:
By announcing his choice, and Senator Long's concurrence, when
he did, Senator Symington made it more difficult for Attorney
General Robert Kennedy to exercise independent judgment on
the matter. Although the Kennedy Administration owes nothing
to Mr. Symington, who for a time was a candidate for the Demo-
cratic presidential nomination, it would naturally be reluctant
to embarrass or humiliate any Senator by rejecting his nominee.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 26, col. 3. A few days later,
in a news story, the paper reported:
Obviously realizing there is a good deal of opposition to Mr.
Meredith because of his lack of judicial background, Senators
Symington and Long decided this week to recommend him for
the post left vacant by the death of United States District Judge
Randolph Weber, rather than Judge Moore's seat. This would
enable Mr. Meredith to be appointed quickly on a temporary
basis by President Kennedy, and to serve on this basis until
confirmed by the Senate. Such an appointment would tend
to prevent opposition forming.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 29, 1961, p. 3B, col. 3.
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pointment for one of several vacant positions than it would have
been where only one vacancy was to be filled.
Basically, the presidential assistants and the Senators, when
they are of the same party, want to avoid open conflict. Both
sides appreciate that each has the ability to inflict heavy dam-
age on the other. The President's men view with heavy heart
a knock-down-drag-out fight in Judiciary Committee hearings,
just as Senators dread having it bruited about in the press back
home that their candidate does not meet Presidential standards.
Negotiations, therefore, begin in a spirit of accommodation. The
principals want to avoid a fight, but most of them are prepared
to take all the ground they can.
Depending upon personality, the principals may be frank
and direct in their approach or they may play it close to the
vest, trying to gauge the true feelings of the others without
giving up the same information on themselves. Frequently,
pointed banter in face-to-face situations is a useful device for
drawing out information. How does the Senator react when the
Deputy Attorney General or his assistant says to him, with a
smile: "Oh you can't be serious about putting Joe Smith on the
bench?" Conversely, the Senator may watch closely for a reac-
tion when he tells the Attorney General in what appears to be a
joking manner: "If Jack Jones doesn't get that judgeship, I'm
going to be MIGHTY unhappy."
If it turns out that the Senator has a man that pleases the
Executive branch, the negotiations are swiftly closed, provided
the reports of the FBI and the ABA Committee on the Judiciary
are in the candidate's favor. If the Senator's candidate does not
please Department officials, or the President's advisors are press-
ing a candidacy which is not to the Senator's liking, or both are
happening at the same time, the jockeying for position becomes
a serious business. The best strategy for the President's agents
at this point is to sit tight and not move forward in the formal
process of appointment. This will cause immediate concern for
the Senator. If the Senator had not been very strong on his
proffered candidate, he may quickly back down and seek agree-
ment on another choice. On the other hand, the Senator may
try to force the issue by dragging his feet in some endeavor
which means a great deal to the President.
Despite frequent allegations to the contrary, appointment
makers do not like to be put in a position in which votes in the
Senate on the President's program depend upon a particular ju-
dicial appointment. Few Senators want to bargain away their
19661
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
independence to vote as they see fit on major issues. It is often
more important to them politically to vote against the President
on a particular issue than to have a specific individual named
judge. The President's assistants may at times feel that going
along with a Senator on a judgeship in return for a key vote
would be in the public interest. Yet, there is good reason for
avoiding such trading. As one Justice Department official sees
it: "Once you give ground even for momentous reasons, you
are in the position of the young lady who was asked if she
would spend the night with a man for a million dollars and,
upon replying 'yes' was asked 'well, how about for five dollars.'
To her outraged 'what do you think I am?' came the answer,
'we've already established that, we're just bargaining on price
now.'" Undoubtedly, there have been occasions when there has
been an unspoken quid pro quo, Presidential acquiescence to a
Senator's wishes with respect to a judicial appointment in re-
turn for a vote, but it has been rarer than is generally believed.
And it must be remembered that when a President does at-
tempt to bargain with judgeships he is limited in what he can do.
For reasons already explored, the President cannot just go
ahead and name someone whom the Senator from the state and
of his party will oppose, and expect to have him confirmed.
Thus, his best currency for purchasing compliance is delay and
favoring one Senator in the state over another.
The idea that judgeships are wantonly bargained away by
Presidents seems to have gained currency as a consequence of a
quotation attributed to Franklin D. Roosevelt.
[W]e must hold up judicial appointments in states where
the delegation is not going along. We must make appointments
promptly where the delegation is with us. Where there is a
division we must give posts to those supporting us. 62
But President Roosevelt was aware of the limitations. He was
not suggesting that his powers be used to secure votes on specific
legislation but rather on general support. This puts a different
complexion on the matter. It is a much higher order of poli-
tics for the party leader to insist upon general support from
party members in the Senate in return for his support than it is
for a President to trade acquiescence on a judgeship for a vote
on one particular issue before the Senate. After all, the notion
that a President should give special consideration to Senators
from his own party should logically call for the same Senators
62. Farley, Why I Broke with Roosevelt, Collier's, June 21, 1947,
p. 13.
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to give special consideration to the President. If they fail to do
so, by what logic can they insist upon preferred treatment for
themselves?
But, whatever one makes of the Roosevelt record, in the
last three administrations judgeships have not been used to pres-
sure Senators to vote right on specific issues. Myths die
slowly, however, and it is not surprising that from time to time
a newsman will report, as Joseph Alsop did, that "getting the
foreign aid bill off the cliff where it was so desperately dangling
also required judgeships and public works and much other
pork and patronage ... "63
White House aides who are involved in liaison work with
Congress like to be kept informed on the status of appointments
so that they will know what to say if queried about an appoint-
ment while talking to a Senator about the President's legislative
program. At times, they may ask that an announcement of a
particular appointment be delayed pending a vote in the Senate,
not to bargain, but rather to prevent a Senator from reacting
to a legislative proposal in a moment of personal pique. In re-
cent years, there has been one situation, but probably not more
than that, in which a Senator made it clear that unless the
President accepted his nominee, he would refuse to go along with
the administration in any matter. Interestingly enough, he did
carry out his threat.
When the President's assistants employ Fabian tactics and
the Senator chooses not to succumb, a ready and available strat-
egy is to try and out wait them. They normally like to fill the
vacancies quickly in order that the work of the judiciary keep
somewhat apace with the demands on it. This gives the Senator
an opportunity to test the resolve of the Executive branch.
However, the Senator is at a disadvantage at this point, for the
political pressure to fill the vacancy comes from within the state
and means more to the Senator than to national officers. Also,
the President might make a recess appointment and this might
make the situation more difficult for the Senator. When things
reach such an impasse, there will generally be more effort to
seek accommodation rather than resort to open warfare. For the
President's aides are not eager to go the route of the recess ap-
pointment which will not avoid, but merely forestall, an open
fight with the Senate which they stand a good chance of losing.
However, the President's assistants may, in their efforts to dis-
63. Alsop, Successful Cliff-hanger, Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1961,
p. All, col. 2.
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suade a Senator from backing a particular candidate, receive a
big assist from an adverse report from the FBI or the ABA Com-
mittee. Not many Senators will want to bear such a cross,
particularly if the grounds for the unfavorable reports are the
kind which will engender public opprobrium if aired.
When accommodation cannot be reached, one of three pos-
sible results occur: The President's men make no effort to fill
the vacancy; the President formally designates a nominee unac-
ceptable to the Senator and invariably loses the contest for con-
firmation, if the Senator fights to the bitter end; or, the President
makes a recess appointment and loses the contest for confirma-
tion at the next session of Congress. As suggested earlier, when
a President employs either of the last two courses of action, the
pressure may be too great for the Senator to persist in opposition.
But the outcomes indicated are based on the assumption that
the Senator will go the full route in opposition. It is important
to stress that ultimately the Senator is not in a position to initi-
ate the action which constitutes a throwing down of the gauntlet
when the impasse has been reached. In a very real sense, the
President's constitutional power to make the formal nomination
provides him with the advantage that is inherent in taking of-
fensive action, whereas the Senator in the moment of truth
has only defensive weapons.
2. Circuit Courts
In making appointments to circuit courts, the balance of
power shifts markedly to favor decision making by the Presi-
dent's men. The power of the individual Senator with respect
to appointments to the district bench was derived from the cus-
tom of senatorial courtesy. By the nature of things, this custom
cannot be invoked effectively where circuit court judgeships are
involved. Each circuit covers at least three states. No one
Senator or pair of Senators can claim that they are the only
members of the Senate with a vital interest in appointments to
the court. In fact, Senators from the states covered by the
circuit necessarily vie with each other to obtain consideration
for their choices. Since there is no legal prescription for dis-
tributing circuit judgeships geographically, no Senator can claim
that as a matter of legal right a particular nomination should go
to a person from his state. Conceivably, Senators from states in
a circuit could combine and work out a plan for distributing cir-
cuit judgeships among the states and present a united front
against the President if he failed to recognize the plan, but this
[Vol. 51:185
FEDERAL JUDGES
occurs infrequently. In such a context, a Senator from one
state objecting to an appointment to the circuit court approved
by the Senators of the state from which the appointment is
made cannot hope for support from his colleagues in the face of
conflicting claims for support. But, as suggested earlier, sena-
torial courtesy can be invoked effectively by a Senator of the
state from which the nominee of the President comes.
What this means in practice is that the President's agents
may pick and choose among candidates urged upon them by the
Senators of the President's party from all the states in the cir-
cuit. More importantly, it gives them more latitude for selecting
their own candidates by manipulating the Senators' desire to
have the appointment made from their own state, even if they
have to give way on the precise choice.64 Obviously, it is im-
portant to a Senator's political prestige to appear able to obtain
a larger share of patronage than others.
Just as in the case of district judgeships, some Senators
eschew responsibility for designating and pushing candidates for
circuit judgeships, reserving the right to oppose a nominee from
their own state who is distasteful to them. But most Senators
will strive to have the judgeship go to someone from his state.
In this connection, the Senator will endeavor to show why his
candidate deserves more consideration, either on the grounds
that his state rates the post or that his candidate is superior to
others, or both.65
In making their selection, the President's assistants quite
clearly are limited by: the FBI report, the ABA Committee
report, the home state Senators' reactions; and, the political
64. Suppose they have in mind a first-rate man from the state of
Missouri for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Suppose also that the Senator from Missouri, of the President's party,
has been pushing a candidate which is not acceptable to the President's
men. The President's men are in position to say to the Missouri Senator,
"we cannot appoint your candidate. If you persist to pushing him, we'll
just have to appoint Smith (who is the choice of the Minnesota Senators
of the President's party). However, if you can see your way clear to
accepting Jones of Missouri (the person they really want), we will be
happy to appoint him."
65. The following is a typical presentation made by a Senator in
a letter to the Attorney General:
For many years New Jersey has had only one of the sevenjudgeships in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Con-
sidering all factors including, importantly, the relative volume
of the Court's business originating in New Jersey, we feel very
strongly that an increase in New Jersey's representation on the
Court would be most appropriate assuming, of course, that the
right man can be found. Judge Q- is indisputably the right
man.
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power of the Senators who have manifested a great interest in
particular candidacies. None of these factors has a precise value
in the equation which adds up to appointment. Rather, each
appointment is the result of an interplay of forces which is
sui generis. However, the fact remains that the President and
his assistants, and the forces which pressure them, play a more
important role in the selection of circuit judges than of district
judges.
3. The Other Federal Courts
In appointing judges to the District Court of the District of
Columbia, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the
United States Court of Claims and the United States Customs
Court, the power of the individual Senator is further diminished
in favor of the President. Since the selection for these posts can
be made from any state in the union, any one Senator's claim to
an appointment is necessarily weak. This does not mean, how-
ever, that Senators will not endeavor to press candidacies for
these posts. On the contrary, a Senator frequently desires to
place less qualified persons to whom a political debt may be ow-
ing in those posts. If such parties were to be appointed to the
district court in the Senator's state or the court of appeals in the
circuit, a poor performance on the judge's part would be a con-
stant reminder of the Senator's poor judgment. Discontent
with a particular judge may help contribute to disenchantment
with the Senator who urged his appointment among constitu-
ents, particularly among lawyers who as a group are articulate
and politically powerful. Consequently, the best solution in such
cases is for the Senator to secure for his man an appointment to
a federal bench outside the state.
When it comes to the District Court and the Appeals Court
for the District of Columbia, there is a powerful countervailing
force to this unloading process. Because the District of Columbia
is the situs of the federal government, a large share of impor-
tant court actions involving government agencies and officials
are brought to those courts. The Executive Department, there-
fore, will strongly oppose the placement of less qualified per-
sons on the bench of courts which are so important and to
which they must bring much of their own considerable legal
business.
For the special courts, there is no such countervailing force.
There is a tendency for the President's assistants to regard these
courts as relatively unimportant. It is not regarded as a great
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compromise of principle to oblige a Senator or to meet the
President's own political obligations by appointing to those
courts persons who would not meet standards they set for dis-
trict and appeals courts. Note, however, that the number of
these posts is limited and Senators, in making claims to them,
must compete with all other Senators of the President's party as
well as with those individuals who want the posts and who have
legitimate claim to special consideration from the President.
Senators who hold powerful positions in the Senate formal and
informal hierarchies and Senators who have been exceptionally
loyal to the President will normally be able to do more to secure
the nominations for their candidates. It is unlikely, however,
that any one Senator will secure more than one such nomination
from any administration.
Again, it is important to emphasize that a Senator of the
President's party may effectively forestall the nomination of a
person from his own state to a national office if that person is
not acceptable to him. That this generalization applies to nomi-
nations for the special courts is illustrated by the late Senator
Harry F. Byrd's effective opposition to the confirmation of J.
Lindsay Almond for a post on the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals.6" For this reason, the President's men will normally
clear such appointments with the Senators of the state from
which their desired appointee comes before making the designa-
tion official. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall President
Kennedy's answer in a press conference to a question regarding
the difficulty in securing confirmation for Almond:
Well, I don't quite understand why the Senate is failing to act.
Almond's the distinguished Governor of Virginia. It was my
understanding when his name was sent up here there was no
objection by the Senators that were involved.6 7
The President's words suggest that no effort was initially made
to by-pass Senator Byrd, but rather that the signals were
crossed.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the time has come to set aside the simplistic
explanation that Senators alone determine appointments to the
federal bench. For better or worse, the process is much more
complicated and, indeed, much more interesting. Any assessment
from this quarter of the efficacy of the process, in terms of the
quality of the judges appointed, must await completion of a
larger study of which this is a part.
66. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1962, p. 8, col. 4.
67. N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1962, p. 14, col. 8.
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